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I. Introduction
Since the destruction and despair caused by the dust bowl of the 1930’s, Americans and
their government have taken a keen interest in natural resource conservation policy on
agricultural land throughout the country. As a reflection of this, the farm bill of 1936 entitled the
“Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act” included for the first time provisions that
provided payments and support to farmers willing to employ soil conservation measures on their
farms (Cain and Lovejoy, 2004). While the main purpose of this bill was to provide financial
support to impoverished farmers dealing with low commodity prices, the fact remains that
natural resource conservation was starting to become an important issue for the American public.
Over time, conservation titles in the farm bill have evolved into legislation that not only
protect soil from erosion, but they now include incentives for improving water quality and water
quantity problems, provisions that prohibit draining wetlands for agricultural production, land
retirement programs such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), and working land
programs like the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). Expenditures for
conservation measures have also significantly increased over time. For example, the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided nearly 4.5 billion dollars for conservation
programs in the farm bill for fiscal year 2005, compared to 500 million dollars for the 1983 fiscal
year (ERS, 2007). It also appears this trend of increased conservation expenditures will
continue, as the 2008 farm bill doubles the level of conservation funding under the previous farm
bill. Of this new money, nearly two thirds is scheduled to be allocated to working land programs
like EQIP (ERS, 2007).
While giving monetary payments to individual producers engaging in conservation
activities is ultimately a policy decision, the underlying assumption for these payments is one

borne out of traditional microeconomic theory. Specifically, microeconomics theory assumes
that all producers are rational agents engaging in activities that will maximize profits. However,
most conservation activities are not inherently profitable to the individual farmer; so,
conservation payments are provided under the assumption that the only way to increase
participation in conservation programs is to increase profits received by the individual farmer. In
effect, conservation payments can be seen as incentives or “bribes” that should make
conservation activity more attractive to the individual producer.
If the profit-maximization theory of standard microeconomics is correct in predicting
individual farmer behavior, it would then be expected that the rapid expansion in government
expenditures for conservation payments to individual producers would lead to great
improvements in environmental quality throughout the country. Recent empirical evidence,
though, is showing that this is not the case. For example, modeling of conservation behavior in
the upper Mississippi River region indicated that increasing conservation payments at the
individual producer level would produce minimal change in rates of soil erosion, nitrate
leaching, and nitrate runoff in the area (Wu, Adams, Kling, and Tanaka, 2004). These authors
concluded that conservation payments, which were modeled as an increase in profits to
individual farmers, are not likely to be cost effective on their own for addressing pollution
problems in the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico.
Based on anecdotal evidence and empirical research, it appears that individual farmers
are motivated to engage in (or not engage in) conservation strategies by a multitude of factors.
While it is undeniable that profits do play a role in conservation decisions, the assumption that it
plays the only role in economic decision making is highly contentious. For instance, work by
Nowak and Korsching (1998) indicates that inadequacies in U.S. soil and water conservation

policies can be attributed to a misunderstanding of the human dimension (sociological and
psychological factors) of farmers, and not a lack of conservation expenditures. Work from Sen
(1977) also concludes that individuals may ultimately make choices based on sympathy and
commitment to others, even if the outcomes do not maximize a person’s self-interest. He even
writes that a person pursuing only selfish interests, as is modeled in microeconomics, is nothing
more than a “rational fool” and a “social moron” (Sen, 1977). Even Adam Smith’s The Theory
of Moral Sentiments indicates that there are fundamental elements of human nature that
transcend that of pursuing individual self-interest (Smith, 1790).
While it has long been realized that both financial and non-financial factors motivate
farmer behavior, the conservation literature has been unable to evolve a settled and unified
account of egoistic-financial and non-financial social motives that ultimately drive human
behavior (Chouinard, Paterson, Wandschneider, and Ohler, 2008). However, it seems that the
theoretical framework of metaeconomics (Lynne, 1999, 2006ab), which combines
egoistic/hedonistic self-interest motivations with empathetic/sympathetic other-interest
motivations into one coherent theory of human behavior, can provide new insights into farmer
conservation behavior and human behavior, more generally. Therefore, this emerging framework
was used to analyze tillage decisions in the context of a water quality conflict between upstream
farmers and downstream water suppliers in the Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake Watershed of
Nebraska and Kansas.
The organization of this paper will proceed as follows. A brief review of the
conservation literature, including papers that describe finanical motives, non-financial motives,
and multiple-motive/multiple-utility for conservation adoption, is presented in Section II.
Section III presents the theoretical framework used to analyze tillage decisions in the Blue

River/Tuttle Creek Lake Watershed. The empirical model is described in Section IV. Of
particular interest are variables that measure financial capacity, capacity to
empathize/sympathize, preferences for control over farming practices, and habitual tendencies.
Section V presents the major findings of this study, and finally, Section VI provides concluding
statements.
II. Review of Conservation Literature
Financial motives are the most widely cited account for conservation adoption on farms.
These motives most generally include a desire for greater profits, but may also include other
financial attributes including asset growth, risk reduction, and financial liquidity (Chouinard et
al, 2008). For instance, a model used by Cary and Wilkinson (1997) hypothesized that five
factors could explain the planting of trees and deep rooted grasses on farms and pastures in south
eastern Australia. Of these factors, the idea that the conservation practice in question must be
perceived as economically profitable before adoption will occur was of paramount importance.
In the end, the authors concluded that, in general, “…the best way to increase the use of
conservation practices to overcome land degradation…will be to ensure the practices are
economically profitable” (Cary and Wilkinson, 1997, p. 20).
Several other writings attempt to estimate the cost responsiveness of a farmer’s adoption
of soil-conserving and/or runoff- reducing practices using data from surveys on stated
preferences. For example, Lohr and Park (1995) attempt to determine the cost responsiveness of
planting filter strips under the filter strip provision of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
for farmers in Michigan and Illinois. Using a contingent valuation (CV) framework, this study
sought to evaluate whether a respondent would participate in the program and determine the
percentage of eligible land that each willing participant would enroll in the program in response

to a proposed payment. Results of the study indicated that the “payment” variable, which was
defined as the per acre offer to farmers as inducement to join the filter strip program, had a
positive and significant effect on the probability of a farmer joining the filter strip program.
Like the study conducted by Lohr and Park (1995), Cooper and Keim (1996) also use a
CV framework in order to determine farmers’ cost responsiveness to five different practices that
protect water quality. Results indicated that incentive payment offers ranging between 35 and 65
dollars would be required to entice 50 percent of their sample to participate in the surveyed
conservation practices.
The aforementioned studies find a significant degree of cost responsiveness and
downward sloping demand for conservation practices. This suggests that subsidies for
conservation technologies applied on working farmland are likely to yield substantial increases
in the use of such practices. However, models of stated preferences do not always provide good
predictors of actual behavior, making it desirable to validate the results with studies using
revealed preference data. Lichtenberg (2004) uses such a study to analyze conservation
decisions by farmers in Maryland. The analysis conducted by Lichtenberg uses survey data
combined with information on standard unit costs of installing seven soil-conserving and/or
runoff-reducing conservation practices as identified by a Maryland state cost-sharing program
Latent demand models for each of the seven practices were developed and all exhibit a
downward slope, suggesting that cost sharing could have a strong impact on the adoption of
these conservation practices in Maryland.
While the conservation literature appears to be dominated by work citing financial
motives as the primary driver of the adoption of conservation practices, a considerable amount of
work shows that other, non-financial factors can play a role in the conservation decision made by

farmers. For example, a study of Missouri farmers conducted by Ervin and Ervin (1982)
indicates that personal factors attributed to the individual farmer may have a substantial impact
on the number of adopted conservation practices. In fact, the authors note that the two most
important variables in explaining the number of conservation practices employed on an
individual farm were “…either personal characteristics or related to personal characteristics:
education and perception of the degree of erosion problem” (Ervin and Ervin, 1982, p. 286).
Their findings also suggest that governmental assistance to farm operators in erosion prone areas
should possibly vary depending upon operator characteristics.
Similarly, a study of the Central Platte River Valley of Nebraska conducted by Supalla
(2003) suggests that the best way to convince producers of irrigated agriculture to use
conservation practices that protect water quality is through expanded educational programs. In
this study, Supalla notes that producers in the area have developed a stewardship ethic and are
willing to forego profits in order to use best management practices (BMPs) that enhance water
quality in the region. In fact, it was discovered through an attitudinal survey that 85 percent of
producers in the region were willing to voluntarily accept lower net returns in exchange for
reduced groundwater pollution (Supalla et al., 1995, cited in Supalla, 2003, p. 96).

Therefore, it

appears that a lack of knowledge concerning BMPs, not income, may be the deciding factor in
the decision to adopt conservation technologies along the Central Platte River Valley. Thus,
policy instruments that stress education may be more likely to increase conservation technology
adoption rates than policies that stress financial incentives or direct regulation.
In addition to human capital studies that stress general farmer characteristics like age and
education levels, several other studies have analyzed the importance of farmer values and
attitudes when making a decision regarding the adoption of conservation practices. Wallace and

Clearfield (1997) examined the reasons why producers adopt stewardship practices and
determined that many voluntarily install conservation practices on their land because it is the
“right thing to do.” They also indicated that many farmers and ranchers see private ownership
not as a right to do what they please with the land, but as a right to be stewards of the land.
Also, the researchers showed that, even when facing difficulties, many agricultural producers
have maintained an attitude and ethic that treats farming and ranching as “a way of life,” and not
a venture to maximize profits (Wallace and Clearfield, 1997, p. 4).
Maybery, Crase, and Gullifer (2005) also show the importance that values and attitudes
can have in shaping conservation behavior. Survey responses from farmers in New South Wales,
Australia showed that producers in this region had three distinct values in regard to their farming
operations: economic, conservation, and lifestyle. Also of importance was the fact that a clear
separation existed between economic and conservation values, as well as economic and lifestyle
values. This suggests that “…ideologically different policy approaches may have separate
pathways of influence within landholder decision making” (p 68). Therefore, it can be
reasonably inferred that those with strong conservation goals and weak economic goals are
unlikely to respond to financial incentives as motives to engage in conservation practices.
Conversely, those with weak conservation values are not likely to buy into volunteer
conservation practices that will sacrifice profit. Yet, this study still shows that financial motives
alone cannot entirely predict participation in conservation programs in this region.
As evidenced from the studies cited above, it is clear that farmers can be motivated to
adopt conservation practices by both financial and personal/attitudinal considerations that are not
directly related to profit or financial capacity considerations. However, as shown by Chouinard
et al. (2008), the literature has largely stepped around using a systematic integration of these two

types of goals to describe conservation behavior, either by assuming that only maximum profits
and/or minimum costs matter, or by adding social and stewardship factors in an ad hoc way.
However, a recent subset of the conservation literature has started to use such an integrated
approach in an attempt to substantively explain a wide variety of conservation behaviors.
Lynne, Shonkwiler, and Rola (1988) were among the first researchers to use a multiplemotive framework and apply it to an analysis of conservation decision-making. They collected
attitudinal data, as well as context variable data including income and farm terrain, from farmers
in the panhandle of Florida. Results from the study showed that attitudes toward conservation,
perception of environmental problems, farm ownership, current profitability, income per effort,
and risk were all important in predicting the effort of conservation adoption in the region.
As an evolution to multiple-motive studies like that cited above, Lynne (1995) developed
a new behavioral economic model in which a farmer (or person in general) is proposed to pursue
multiple-utilities or multiple interests. Taking cues from Sen (1977) and Etzioni (1986), Lynne
proposed that individuals pursue not only a self-interest utility as modeled in microeconomics,
but also a shared other-interest utility rooted in social norms and the ideas of sympathy, metaranking, and commitment (Sen, 1977). He labels each of these utilities as “I” and “We” utilities,
respecitvely. It was hypothesized that the addition of the “We” utility to conventional economic
models could greatly improve the explanatory power of studies intended to describe farmer
conservation behavior.
Over time, the multiple-utility model proposed by Lynne has been refined and given the
name “metaeconomics” (Lynne, 1999, 2006a). The metaeconomic model has been tested in
several different settings. Lynne (1995) used this model in an attempt to detail the adoption of
irrigation technologies that improve water use efficiency by strawberry growers in Florida;

Lynne and Casey (1998) and Casey and Lynne (1999) test the model in order to understand the
adoption of drip irrigation technology by Florida tomato farmers; and Sautter, Ovchinnikova,
Kruse, and Lynne (2008) use the meateconomic framework to explain the adoption of
conservation tillage in portions of Nebraska. The theory has been applied in areas oustide of the
conservation literature as well, suggesting that it may be applicable in describing many different
types of behavior. For instance, Artikov and Lynne (2005) use metaeconomics to elucidate
farmers’ use of weather information, and Kalinowski, Lynne, and Johnson (2006) use the theory
to explain recycling behavior by citizens in Nebraska. In all of the examples cited above,
empirical results indicate the presence of joint self-interest (“I”) and shared other-interest (“We”)
utilities or interests, together forming an internalized own-interest. Also, as hypothesized, the
predictive capacity of the behaviroal models significantly improved with the inclusion of
variables that served as proxies for a shared other-interested utility.
While Lynne was the first to propose the theory of metaeconomics, other researchers
have begun to use the idea in recent research. For instance, Chouinard et al (2008) relies heavily
upon the works of Lynne and his various co-authors to show that some farmers in the Pacific
Northwest are willing to trade profits for stewardhsip activities. In this work, the authors
propose that farmers pursue multiple utility, which they label as ego-utility and stewardship
utility, and must reconcile these competing utilities when making conservation choices. Results
from this study provided some empirical evidence that supports the existince of multiple utility
in farmers, as the contingent valuation survey found a median willingness to pay (WTP) of
$4.52/acre for stewardship practices in the sample area.
Work similar to that conducted by Chouinard et al. (2008) was developed by Bishop,
Shumway, and Wandschneider (2009). In this research, as with that of Lynne and Chouinard et

al, the authors theorized that the pursuit of joint and multiple utility (private and social) impacted
the decision to use anaerobic digesters on dairy farms in the Pacific Northwest. Again, as with
previous work in the multiple-utility/multiple-motive realm, the empirical survey used in this
research confirmed the presence of both egoistic/financial motives and social motives when
considering the decision to use anaerobic digesters. The authors also conclude that models that
attempt to integrate both financial and non-financial motives into one coherent theory may work
best when attempting to explain conservation behavior exhibited by farmers.
Intriguingly, the theory of choice behavior presented by Lynne and his various coauthors, Chouinard et al. (2008), and Bishop et al (2009) has been somewhat validated by
research from neuroscientists and evolutionary biologists. In other words, there may acutally be
a biological (physical) basis to multiple motives in humans. Cory (2006a, 2006b), who
appropriately updated the work of evolutionary neuroscientist MacLean (1990), developed the
theory of the human triune brain. In this research, it is documented that the human brain has
evolved into a three level joint and interdependent, modular structure. The three levels are
named the reptilian complex, the paleomammalian (or “old mammalian”) complex, and the
neocortex.
As noted by Bishop et al (2009), researchers have developed a multitude of models to
represent how the pro-social components of behavior are woven into the triune brain structure.
However, for the purposes of this research, there is no need to resolve the competing models
dealing with brain structure. Rather, it is more important to acknowledge that two brain systems
exist, —“a system effectuating egoistic behavior (moslty self-regarding motivation) and a system
of pro-social or other-regarding motivation which causes a person to empathize or ‘walk in
another’s shoes’” (Bishop et al, 2009). In other words, the pro-social system has facilitated the

development of internalized, shared motives. The dual motives in the brain invoke both
complementary and competitive neural processes, but these activities are always interconnected
and ultimately resolved. In empirical measurement of neural activity, the dual motives of the
brain have different neural firing patterns, but the systems communicate throught the neocortex,
and both connect to the higher, hedonic reward centers of the brain (Fehr and Camerer, 2007;
cited in Bishop et al, 2009).
Based upon the work from behavioral economists and neuroscientists, it appears
reasonable to hypothesize that egoistic-financial and social-moral factors can influence
conservation decisions made by farmers. It is the contention herein that models that integrate
selfish and social motivations into one coherent behavioral theory may ultimately provide a
better model for explaining conservation adoption on farms than models proposed by standard
microeconomic theory.
III. Theoretical Framework
Metaeconomics, as first proposed by Lynne (1999), is a theory in behavioral economics
that looks to transcend the traditional framework of standard microeconomics (Lynne, 2006a,
2006b). Traditional microeconomic theory assumes that an individual pursues only one interest,
which is ultimately derived from pursuing selfish and hedonistic tendencies. Conversely,
metaeconomics, which uses a framework similar to that introduced by Etzioni (1986), proposes a
dual-motive, dual-utility model of the individual. Specifically, metaeconomics proposes that an
individual jointly pursues both an egoistic-hedonistic based self-interest utility/tendency and an
empathy-sympathy based other-interest utility/tendency, with the latter being shared with others.
Importantly, these dual interests are viewed as non-separable and are jointly internalized within
the own-interest of an individual (Sautter, Ovchinnikova, Kruse, and Lynne, 2008).

The essence of the metaeconomic framework (and the embedded theory that the human
brain is as described by Cory (2006a and 2006b)) is presented in Figure 1. Careful inspection of
the figure reveals several major differences from the traditional microeconomic production
model. First, note that there are two sets of isoquants that represent both the egoistic-hedonistic
self-interest (IG) and the empathetic-sympathetic shared other-interest (IM). Also note the
absolute overlap of the dual self-interest and shared other-interest isoquants. The intersection of
both interests at every point in the space is represented at points A, B, and C. This overlap of the
dual interests represents the foundation of the metaeconomic model. In the context of the
farming community, traditional profit-bearing outputs like corn and soybeans are represented in
the IG isocurves, whereas shared, more community based outputs like less chemical and sediment
loadings to nearby water sources, enhancement of ecosystems, and long-term farm sustainability
are represented in the IM isocurves.
Figure 1 also demonstrates that, due to the jointness and non-separability of the dual
interests, a farmer is unable to pick a certain level of self-interest without simultaneously
choosing a level of shared other-interest. Yet, the tendency within the conservation literature is
to treat the choice behavior of farmers as separable independent effects involving mere tradeoffs
(Sautter et al, 2008). Thus, the two interests are implicitly modeled as separate components in
the literature, and not like the interrelated paths 0G and 0M.
A farmer that pursues path 0G, or, in the extreme case the vertical axis, is described as
Homo economicus, and is assumed to have his or her behavior arise only out of self-interested
tendencies. In contrast to a farmer that pursues only self-interest, though, metaeconomics
proposes that a farmer may also wish to pursue the shared other-interest on expansion path 0M.
A person that pursues this path can be characterized as Homo sociologicus, akin to the nature of

human behavior presumed in standard sociology. A farmer portrayed in this fashion is assumed
to be motivated in their behavior by empathetic-sympathetic tendencies such as roles in the
farming community, interdependence and identifying with place and others, and community
norms and traditions. Pursuing these community oriented tendencies would again maximize
outcomes (i.e. maximize profit and the utility it can buy), but it is maximized in the other-interest
domain by achieving shared community oriented goals at point C. By settling upon point C in
the space, a farmer uses many conservation techniques and will use relatively small amounts of
industrial inputs. Control over farming processes is also desired less at this point. Also, drawing
upon philosophy, we find that farmers maximizing the shared other-interest are choosing to buy
more completely into a conservation ethic, which is all about “feeling with” or being “in
sympathy with” (Solomon, 2007, p. 64) other conservation farmers and downstream water users
valuing higher quality water. Without first identifying with and walking in the same space as
others, though, a shared conservation ethic could not evolve.
As noted, the conservation literature assumes that the self-interest and shared otherinterest tendencies are considered independently by the individual decision maker.
Metaeconomics, meanwhile, proffers that both dispositions must be considered jointly and
simultaneously when making a decision. Instead of choosing to maximize either the self-interest
or shared other-interest tendency, metaeconomics posits that the individual strives to integrate
both interests on path 0Z in order to make a choice that satisfies both domains and provides
peace of mind to the decision maker. This is represented by point B in the space. At point B, the
conflict between the self-interest and shared other-interest within the individual has been
resolved and integrated into an own-interest that considers both the self and others.

Closer examination of point B also leads one to recognize that metaeconomics allows for
the individual farmer to engage in self-sacrifice in both domains of interest. At this point, we
find that the farmer has settled upon the intersection of IG2, IM2, and the budget/capital constraint
RoRo. Yet, if a farmer intended to maximize while acting on the self-interest tendency or otherinterest tendency, he or she would orient themselves to the intersection of the budget constraint
with either isoquant IG3 or IM3, respectively. By locating at point B, farmers are choosing to give
up a little in both domains. This is to say, the producer may give up some profit in order to
install conservation measures on their farms and do the right thing for the environment, yet they
also give up some of the outcomes from pursuing less in the way of shared other-interest in order
to earn enough profit to remain viable. Thus, point B becomes a type of “satisficing” choice for
the farmer, and as noted, provides a certain peace of mind. We have a kind of Homo satisficicus
state of being on path 0Z. Intriguingly, recent empirical evidence has shown that farmers engage
in exactly this type of decision-making process. In their study of farmers in the Pacific
Northwest, Chouinard et al (2008) found that producers, on average, are willing to give up $4.52
per acre in order to invest in conservation on farms. This money represents a sacrifice in what
the authors called the ego-utility (self-interest) domain. However, these farmers are also
sacrificing in the social-utility (shared other-interest) domain in order to make their farming
operations profitable. So, we find a type of satisficing choice has been made.
Not only does metaeconomics make the role of self-sacrifice explicit when describing
choice behavior, it also describes how control and self-control play an important role in decision
making. For example, a farmer moving along path 0G will likely use intensive tillage practices
on crop acres in order to help facilitate deeper root penetration, help maintain soil fertility, and
destroy weeds. In contrast, a person moving along path 0M is much more willing to use reduced

or conservation tillage systems on his or her farm and to give more control to the natural
ecological system. A farmer on this path is also more likely to give in to more control coming
out of regulations, or other kinds of external controls (i.e. landlords). Thus, we find that a farmer
on path 0M may integrate the need for less control over his or her farm processes with the desire
to give more control to the shared other-interest (Sautter et al, 2008). This integration results in
the farmer helping to eliminate soil erosion while also buying into a conservation or
sustainability ethic.
It follows that making the role and need for self-control explicit is also an important
feature of metaeconomics. Farmers that are on the satisficing path 0Z will be tempted by both
inward desires and outside influences to move back to path 0G and maximize the egoistichedonistic interest, or they may ultimately succumb to social and community norms and the
conservation ethic exhibited by path 0M and attempt to maximize the empathetic-sympathetic
interest. So, self-control is needed by the individual in order to act independently and with
courage in order to achieve satisfactory outcomes in the two parts of the individual’s owninterest as demonstrated by path 0Z. Thus, as noted by Sautter et al (2008), “the preference for
control and the ability to take control also temper the self-interest in moving toward path 0Z.”
Finally, it is important to note that metaeconomics posits that the isoquant sets IG and IM
as well as the expansion paths 0G and 0M tend to be in the subconscious of the individual and
are not often considered. While paths 0G and 0M may frame the space that cognitive and
conscious individual thought occurs within, the paths themselves come to be through “instinct”
or intuition (Kahneman, 2003). It is also likely that even 0Z, once cognitively considered, may
become part of an individual’s intuition. This is especially true if the decision to be made is one
that occurs on a routine basis. In fact, this is a major theme woven throughout a recent piece

written by McCown (2005). In his writing, McCown, who is building upon the idea of
phenomenology in decision making submitted by Schutz and Luckmann (1973), notes that “in
normal routine activity, commitments are made, and action is taken without conscious
deliberation” (p. 22, emphasis added); so, commitments to the shared interest represented in 0M
lead to tempering the pursuit of self-interest 0G, leading to routine on path 0Z.
IV. Empirical Model
The ultimate goal of this research is to use the information and insights gained in order to
promote increased usage of conservation measures in the Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake
watershed that enhance water quality in the Lake and watershed. For this reason, models that are
probabilistic in nature are best suited to analyze conservation behavior in the study area. In other
words, we seek to understand how changes in independent variables impact the probablility of
adopting conservation technologies on working farms, with particular attention being focused on
the individual farmer’s decision regarding tillage strategies. Therefore, models of the logit
variety are used to test conservation behavior in the four county target area.
Four logit models of the following functional forms are used to test the metaeconomic
theory presented in Section III:
(1)

β 0 β 1( Ri ) + β 2( Ni ) + ε i
Pr(0, X 1) =+

(2)

β 0 β 1( Ri ) + β 2( Ni ) + β 3( IGi * IMi ) + ε i
Pr(0, X 1) =+

(3)

Pr(0, X 1) =+
β 0 β 1( Ri ) + β 2( Ni ) + β 3( IMi * IGi ) + β 4( Hi ) + ε i

(4)

β 0 β 1( Ri ) + β 2( Ni ) + β 3( IMi * IGi ) + β 4( Hi ) + β 5( IGi *Vi ) + ε i
Pr(0, X 1) =+

where Ri = the income (as a proxy for financial and capital capacity) of the ith farmer; Ni = the
physical characteristics of the ith farmer’s crop land; IGi = proxy for self-interest of the ith farmer;
IMi = proxy for the shared other-interest of the ith farmer; Hi = proxy for habitual tendencies of

the ith farmer; and Vi = proxy for preference for control by ith farmer. Notice that equation (1)
represents the standard empirical derived demand equation given in standard production
microeconomics, whereas equation (2) represents the empirical derived demand equation offered
by metaeconomic theory. Equations (3) and (4) build upon the metaeconomic model by adding
important variables that account for habitual tendencies and preferences for control exhibited by
the individual farmer.
Description of Study Area
The Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake watershed covers a large portion of southcentral and
southeast Nebraska, as well as northeast Kansas (See Figure 2). However, the use of natural
resource assesment maps and empirical surface water quality data allowed physical scientists
from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln to identify a critical four county area of nonpoint
source runoff that may impact Tuttle Creek Lake near the Nebraska-Kansas border (Shea et al,
2006). This critical area includes Jefferson and Gage counties in Nebraska, as well as
Washington and Marshall counties in Kansas. Therefore, efforts to promote behavioral
modification involving conservation measures on farms has been targeted to this four county
area.
While the physical characteristics of the land in the watershed contribute to water quality
issues in region, the current institutional situation in the watershed also contributes to water
quality problems in the region. The historical presumption in the watershed has been that
farmers upstream of Tuttle Creek Lake have the right to allow chemicals and sediments to runoff
and deposit into rivers and streams. Traditionally, upstream farmers have not been obligated to
be concerned with downstream water users’ rights to clean water. Both state laws and the
Federal Clean Water Act put the burden of cleaning contaminated water on those that are

currently using the water, unless the water users can definitively show which entities are creating
the water pollution; and since agricultural runoff is a non-point source of pollution, those
downstream of Tuttle Creek Lake can not show precisely who is causing the poor water quality
in the Lake.
In recent years, the current institutions in the Tuttle Creek Waterhed have been called
into question by downstream water users (instututions are defined as working rules, norms,
traditions, and property relations; see Bromley, 2008). Thus, irritation has started to build within
and between the upstream agricultural producers and downstream water users of the region. The
questioning and evolution of the institutional makeup of the watershed has been brought on for
several reasons, including the desire for clean water for recreational purposes, general concern
for plants and animals that use the water in the region, and aesthetics. However, of paramount
concern to downstream water users is the quality and quantity of potable water sources in the
region. As noted earlier, outflow from Tuttle Creek Lake helps to provide water flow to the
Kansas River. Shea et al (2006) note that approximately 50 percent of the flow in the Kansas
River can be directly attributed to supplies from Tuttle Creek Lake. This is important to note, as
the Kansas River provides drinking water to major population centers in northeast Kansas,
including Kansas City, Topeka, and Lawrence. Therefore, polluted water from Tuttle Creek
Lake is infiltrating the Kansas River and jeopardizing the quality of the water supply for these
areas in northeast Kansas.
Water quantity is also of concern to the region due to the fact that cities in northeast
Kansas are growing rapidly. Margaret Stafford of the Topeka Capital-Journal (2003) reported
that the population of Johnson County, Kansas had grown by 27 percent between 1990 and 2000,
and that the city of Olathe alone had grown by 47 percent (nearly 30,000 people). Obviously,

this rapid population expansion has strained the ability of municipalities to provide water to their
citizens.

As the population and demand for water continues to grow in the region, Tuttle Creek

Lake will become an ever more important source for water supply. However, as cited earlier, the
capacity for the reservoir to hold water has been reduced due to siltation. Therefore, practices
upstream that contribute to soil erosion and siltation are now looked upon in a negative light by
water suppliers downstream. So, given the interaction between the physical land characteristics
and the social arrangements among the people in the watershed, a study that focuses on
behavioral change that improves water quality in the region was deemed appropriate.
Data Collection
Data for this research was collected via a mail survey instrument, and the procedure for
administering the survey followed the basic “Dillman (2000) survey method.” 1 A total of 4,191
surveys were mailed to known farm operators in the four county target area of the watershed.
Names and addresses of operators were obtained from farm operator lists maintained by the local
county offices of the Farm Service Agency, U.S. Department of Agriculture. According to the
FSA, the population of the four county area consists of 3,731 total operators. In the original
survey mailing, operators were offered $40 to complete the survey. A subsequent mailing of the
survey commenced a few weeks after the first mailing was complete. This mailing included a
random subsample of 460 non-respondents of the original 3,731 operators. This time,
respondents were offered $80 for their completed questionairres. Overall, the response rate from
the 3,731 operators was 17.1 percent (639 survey responses). Due to missing responses on the
proposed dependent variables, 498 surveys were used for statistical analysis.
While a survey response rate of 17.1 percent is not out of line with other similar research
(see Chouinard et al (2008)), some may choose to argue that the response is too low to make
1

A copy of the survey instrument and raw data collected for this research is available upon request.

generalizations about the farming population in the four county target area. However, there is
evidence to suggest that the survey response rate may in fact be larger than 17.1 percent. First,
the survey created was intended to be administered to farm operators in the target area, as the
operators are the individuals most likely to be in the field making conservation decisions.
However, the primary investigators listed on the cover page of the administered survey received
several phone calls and e-mail correspondences from individuals that had received the survey
that do not participate in day-to-day farming operations. Thus, this antecdotal evidence suggests
that both operators as well as owners/landlords may have received the survey. The potential
exists that the FSA farm operator lists obtained were not properly maintained and oversampling
may have occurred.
There is other evidence to suggest that oversampling may have occurred. As noted, FSA
operator lists indicated that there were 3,731 operators located in the four county target area in
the watershed. Yet, according to the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) census for
2002, there is only a total of 3,184 farms in the four county target region. Therefore, if it is
assumed that each farm has one principal operator, oversampling by nearly 550 individuals
occurred in the sample. If we remove these 550 surveys from the overall sample, the survey
response rate is 20 percent.
Description of Variables Used
Dependent Variable:
The dependent variable in this study was named no01, and is a binary (0,1) variable used
to explain the adoption of conservation tillage in the logit analyses. The variable was created
from answers reported in Questions 2a and 2b of the administered survey instrument. Questions
2a and 2b use a matrix format in order to ascertain the number of acres under various types of

tillage regimes. Respondents reported the number of acres under conventional tillage (less than
15 percent crop residue), reduced tillage (15 percent to 30 percent crop residue), and
conservation tillage/no-till (greater than 30 percent crop residue) cropping schemes. Those
respondents that use any amount of conservation tillage/no-till received a score of 1 for the no01
variable, and those that use no conservation tillage/no-till received a score of 0.
Independent Variables:
Income/Financial Capacity (Ri)
Income data from farmers in the Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake watershed was collected
and is an important component in both microeconomic and metaeconomic derived demand
models. The variable, named income2_1, was collected via Question 33 in the administered
survey instrument. This question asked respondents to choose a category that best described
their total income from both gross farm sales and other farm/conservation payments, again, as
noted, to indicate the financial or capital capacity of the farm. Responses were scaled such that
the final income variable is reported in thousand of dollars. Also, missing income values were
treated with mean substitution.
Soil Slope (Ni)
The physical context of the land in production is thought to be an important determinant
in the adoption of conservation technologies. In the case of tillage strategies, the most important
physical factor appears to be soil slope (i.e. land steepness). For this reason, soil slopes are
estimated in the four county critical area of the Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake watershed.
In order to compute soil slope, individual survey respondents were asked to mark an “X”
on a county map in order to indicate the general location of the respondent’s principal farm.
Then, geographic latitude and longitude coordinates of the principal farms were determined by

using the computer program 3-D Topoquads. Once the geograpic coordinates were obtained,
this information was then utilized in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software in order to
obtain information regarding soil slope on a particular respondent’s principal farm.
Other-Interest*Self-Interest (IMi*IGi)
The other-interest*self-interest independent variable is the core variable of the empirical
metaeconomic model. As previously indicated, it is theorized that humans rely upon joint, nonseparable shared other-interest tendencies and self-interest tendencies when making economic
decisions. For this reason, other-interest and self-interest indepenent variables can not be
modeled separately. Thus, it has been decided that proxies for an individual’s shared otherinterest and self-interest tendencies will be multiplied such that both proxies are taken into
account when creating a single independent variable.
Three proxies were used to measure a survey respondent’s orientation toward a shared
other-interest: empathy, measured with portions of the Davis (1980) Empathy Scale (Question 22
of survey); sympathy, measured with a scale created by the authors (Question 23 of survey); and
empathy/others, measured with a scale created by using the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen,
1991) (Question 19 of the survey). The need for three different shared other-interest proxies is
due to the fact that other-interest dispositions in humans are thought to evolve. For example,
psychologists and neuroscientists like Decety, Michalska, and Akitsuki (2008) have shown with
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) that the programming for empathy has been
“hard-wired” into the brain circuitry of normal functioning children. Their results are consistent
with previous fMRI studies involving adults. Thus, it appears that the ability to empathize with
other humans is an innate characteristic possessed by normal humans. Therefore, it is also
proposed in this paper that all humans have the ability to project themselves into the perceived
mental state of others (i.e. “walk in the shoes of others”).

While empathy is defined as the ability to project oneself into the mental state of others,
sympathy is defined in a much different manner. While most relate sympathy to feelings of
compassion, this paper defines sympathy in much the same way as it is defined by the
philosopher Solomon (2007): a human’s ability to sympathize is characterized as the ability to
buy into a specific group ethic. So, we find that humans can indeed become “in sympathy with”
particular groups and buy into specific group ethics. This is achieved through the use of
empathy. Individuals can project themselves into the state of mind of specific groups and choose
to become in sympathy with the group in question if the group ethic and goals align with the
individual’s goals. So, we find that the key to becoming in sympathy with particular groups is
the act of empathy. In other words, empathy can move an individual towards sympathy.
However, it should be noted that the act of empathizing does not automatically lend itself to
sympathy. Becoming in sympathy with a group is still an individual choice that can be accepted
or rejected, but empathizing does provide important information to the individual that aids in the
decision making process. So, in terms of the research at hand, it is proposed that all inhabitants
in the four county target area have the ability to empathize (albeit some have a greater capacity
than others), but it is unlikely that all inhabitants have become in sympathy with various groups
that use the Blue River watershed and Tuttle Creek Lake.
While the acts of empathizing and sympathizing occur strictly within the individual, it
cannot be denied that the opinions and lobbying of other human beings can in fact influence an
individual’s decision making process. Therefore, the empathy/others variable was created in
order to assess which specific individuals and groups can influence farmer conservation
behavior. Influence from three groups was tested: family members, farm entities (i.e. seed

suppliers, machinery dealers, etc.), and downstream water users. These variables constitute the
final other-interest proxy used in testing the metaeconomic theory in the study area.
While three proxies were needed to evaluate the evolution of shared other-interests of
farmers in our sample, only one proxy was needed to assess a farmer’s orientation toward selfinterest tendencies. The proxy used for this study was the selfism scale created by Phares and
Erskine (1984). This scale has been tested routinely in psychological disciplines, and it has been
deemed as reliable in assessing narcissistic (selfish) tendencies within individuals. This scale
was administered through Question 24 of the survey instrument.
Once the final shared other-interest and self-interest variables were computed, the final
other-interest*self-interest (IMi*IGi) metaeconomic independent variables could be created. In
order to create these variables, the results from the selfism scale were reversed such that the two
multiplicants would be of the same magnitude and direction. Then, the results from each otherinterest proxy were multiplied by the results of the self-interest proxy. The result was five
independent variables that could be used in three separate tests of metaeconomic theory (test of
empathy, test of sympathy, test of empathy/others.
Habit (Ri)
Metaeconomics suggests that most farmers making operating decisions run largely on
emotion or sub-conscious feelings about farming strategies that have worked in the past.
Intriguingly, this assertion is supported by empirical research conducted by Kahneman (2003).
In his work, Kahneman determined that humans in general rely on “intuition” or emotion in their
decision making processes. In fact, he determined that “effortless thought is the norm” in the
everyday lives of humans. So, based on this empirical contribution to the behavioral economic

and psychological economic literature, it seems prudent to add a measure of habit to the
empirical metaeconomic model.
In metaeconomic terms, if someone is on a path 0Z, it is more likely that path will be
maintained through time. In effect, it is proposed that consciously cognitive, rational calculation
and consideration of using more conservation tillage happening at some earlier time simply leads
to underlying, less than cognitive feelings reflected in habitual tendencies. These internalized
past decisions then guide decisions made today (Sautter et. al, 2008). Thus, we find that once
farmers put into practice a new technology, they become rather reluctant to switch back to
practices used in the past.
Habitual tendencies in relation to conservation tillage strategies were measured in the
four county target area by asking the following question: Is the percentage of your farm under
conservation tillage/no-till less, the same, or more than 3 years ago? Responses were recorded
on a seven-point Likert scale.
Self-Interest*Control (IGi*IVi)
As noted earlier, meateconomic theory proposes that a farmer’s preferences for and
perceptions of control over his or her farming operations can make a large impact upon
conservation technologies used on individual farms. For this reason, farmers in the four county
target area of the Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake watershed were asked to respond to several line
items that assess a person’s views in regard to control over specific farm processes.
Question 15 of the composed survey instrument administers the control scale. The scale
assesses three types of control: control over daily farming operations, control that others can
exert over farming decisions, and control over nature.

Respondents were basically asked to mark an “X” on a continuum that measured whether he or
she perceives complete control over conservation practices and their consequences or if he or she
feels that they have no control over conservation practices and their consequences. This is very
similar in nature to the idea of autonomous versus heteronomous control presented by Angyal
(1967), in which autonomous control is represented as internal self-control and heteronomous
control is represented as control exerted upon the individual by others or the environment in
which the individual resides. It is hypothesized, then, that those who feel that they can use
conservation tillage strategies and still maintain a great amount of autonomous control over
farming processes will be more likely to use conservation tillage on individual farms. In
contrast, those that believe using conservation tillage technologies reduce a farmer’s autonomous
control over farming processes will be less likely to use conservation tillage strategies.
V. Results
Summary descriptive statistics for all variables used in the logit models of conservation
tillage adoption in the watershed are provided in Tables 1 through 5. Inspection of the tables
presented provides some interesting insights into the psychological makeup of the respondents in
the four county target area. First, notice that the final selfism scale (Table 1) indicates that selfinterest tendencies are in fact present within farmers in the watershed. However, the mean score
of the scale (3.29) is much less than might be predicted using the standard framing of the
problem of adoption using traditional microeconomics. In fact, a microeconomics frame would
suggest that the mean score of the selfism scale would be much closer to six or seven, and, being
exactly true to the theory, everyone would need to answer seven. Instead, the final selfism score
shows that respondents are actually closer to selfless, rather than selfish.

In addition to selfish tendencies being present within respondents in the watershed,
survey results also indicate that shared other-interest tendencies in the form of empathy and
sympathy also exist within the region (Table 2). Intriguingly, a comparison of the mean results
of self-interest tendencies and shared other-interest tendencies in the watershed actually show
that shared other-interest tendencies occur at a greater magnitude than self-interest tendencies.
This finding places traditional, microeconomic based renditions of farmer behavior in question.
Closer inspection of Table 2 also provides some critical information regarding
metaeconomic theory. Previously, it was noted that metaeconomics theorizes that all individuals
are born with an innate ability to empathize with other individuals. The ability to empathize,
then, can ultimately lead an individual to become “in sympathy with” the ethic and goals of a
particular group of people. It was carefully noted, though, that the ability to empathize does not
necessarily lead to sympathy.
Information given in Table 2 shows that this idea may in fact be plausible. The mean
score of the final empathy scale is 5.06 units. Given that empathy was measured with a sevenpoint Likert scale, it is obvious that respondents clearly have the ability to empathize with other
individuals. Comparing the empathy scale with the scale that measures sympathy, though,
indicates that there is a great amount of variability in the respondents’ ability to sympathize with
groups that use Tuttle Creek Lake. First, the mean score of the sympathy scale was 4.73 units, a
result that is lower than the mean score of the final empathy scale. Second, and more
importantly, the standard deviation of the sympathy scale was 1.088 units. This result is higher
than the standard deviation of the empathy scale, which produced a result of 0.807 units. Based
upon these numbers, then, we can reasonably speculate that all respondents in the four county
target area have the ability to empathize (albeit at different capacities), whereas not all

respondents have become in sympathy with the ideals and goals of other users downstream that
rely upon Tuttle Creek Lake.
Tables 6 through 8 provide the logit test results used to understand tillage decisions in the
four county critical area of the Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake watershed. In all three models
presented, the column labeled “Role of Capital” is representative of equation (1) and represents
the standard microeconomic empirical derived demand function; the column labeled “Adding
Tempered Self” is representative of equation (2) and represents the most basic metaeconomic
empirical derived demand function; the column labeled “Adding Habitual Tendency” is
representative of equation (3) and adds the aforementioned habit variable to the metaeconomic
derived demand function; and finally, the column labeled “Adding Selfism Reinforced Control”
is representative of equation (4) and adds the three previously mentioned control variables to the
metaeconomic derived demand function.
Examination of the results from all three models provides some very intriguing insights
into what motivates the conservation tillage adoption decision among farmers in the four county
target area above Tuttle Creek Lake. First, take note of the results presented in the column
labeled “Role of Capital” in all three logit models. This is the empirical derived demand model
described in microeconomic-based production economics. As microeconomics would suggest,
we find that income (i.e. financial capacity) is a significant variable that helps to explain a
farmer’s decision to adopt no-till and conservation tillage technologies. The chi-square statistic
for this model also shows the overall model to be significant in explaining tillage behavior.
While the model is significant, though, it should be noted that the coefficient on the income
variable indicates that an increase in income actually has a very small impact on a farmer’s
tillage decision. In fact, a one thousand dollar increase in gross income only increases the odds

of a farmer adopting no-till and conservation tillage strategies by 0.06 percent (i.e. less than one
percent). Also note that the microeconomic model does a poor job of predicting which
respondents do not use no-till and conservation tillage technologies.
While the microeconomic model predicts conservation tillage behavior reasonably well,
it does not compare favorably to the empirical derived demand model proffered by
metaeconomic theory. In fact, we find that regardless of the shared other-interest proxy used
(empathy, sympathy, or empathy/others), the metaeconomic derived demand model predicts
conservation tillage behavior much better than the microeconomic-based derived demand model.
The basic metaeconomic derived demand model is presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8 under
the column labeled “Adding Tempered Self.” Notice that in all three tables, the income variable
remains significant, just as in the microeconomics model. Yet, we also find that the
metaeconomic variables (self-interest*shared other-interest) contribute significantly to
understanding farmer tillage behavior. In Table 6, we find that the empathy*selfism variable is a
significant predictor when attempting to understand tillage behavior in the watershed. The chisquare (block) statistic also shows that adding the tempered self-interest variable improves the
overall model fit. Also, we find that the R-square statistic increased from 0.10 to 0.159.
Table 7, which presents the results of the metaeconomic derived demand model that uses
sympathy as a proxy for an individual’s shared other-interest tendency, tells much the same story
as the results provided in Table 6. Again, income is a significant variable in the individual
tillage decision. However, like the model that uses empathy as a proxy, the sympathy*selfism
variable is also a significant factor in predicting the tillage decision. Finally, we again see that
the chi-square (block) statistic indicates that the addition of the sympathy*selfism variable
improves overall model fit, and the Nagelkerke R-Square statistic increases from 0.10 to 0.12.

Finally, Table 8 presents the metaeconomic derived demand model when the
empathy/others variables are used as proxies for an individual’s shared other-interest tendency.
Yet again, we find that this model tells much the same story as the models presented in Tables 6
and 7. Again, income is a significant variable in the tillage decision, but the farm entity*selfism
coefficient is also significant. Somewhat surprisingly, though, this model shows that both other
lake users and family members do not appear to impact the conservation tillage decision in
farmers residing above Tuttle Creek Lake. Despite these surprising results, the metaeconomic
model presented in Table 7 still yields a better fitting model than the standard production
economics derived demand model. This is evidenced by the significant chi-square (block)
statistic and an increase in the Nagelkerke R-square statistic from 0.10 to 0.185.
The results presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8 show that the metaeconomic derived demand
model yields a better description of what motivates tillage behavior in the watershed than the
microeconomics model. However, it is theorized that the basic metaeconomic model can be
further refined and improved by adding variables that account for individual habitual tendencies
and preferences for control. The columns labeled “Adding Habitual Tendency” and “Adding
Selfism Reinforced Control” provide the results when proxies for these two phenomena are
added to the metaeconomic model.
Inspection of the tables reveals that adding individual habitual tendencies does in fact
improve the basic metaeconomic derived demand model, regardless of which shared otherinterest proxy is used. In all three cases, the habit variable coefficients are significant and in the
hypothesized positive direction. In addition to this, the income and shared other-interest
variables all remain significant in all three models. The addition of a habit variable also
substantially improves the model fit of the metaeconomic derived demand model. All three chi-

square (block) statistics are significant, and in all three instances we find considerable increases
in the Nagelkerke R-square statistics. This suggests that subconscious feelings about tillage
decisions made in the past play a great part in tillage decisions that are made today or in the
future.
Finally, we also find that the control variables presented in the columns labeled “Adding
Selfism Reinforced Control” also help to refine and improve the basic metaeconomic derived
demand model. Regardless of the shared other-interest proxy used, the selfism*farm control
variable becomes a significant predictor when attempting to understand tillage behavior. The
variable is also in the hypothesized negative direction. Again, as when adding the habit variable,
the addition of the selfism reinforced control variables contributes significantly to the overall
model fit, as evidenced by the significant chi-square (block) statistic in all three cases. The
Nagelkerke R-square statistics also increase with the addition of the control variables to the
metaeconomic model. It should be noted, though, that only the selfism*farm control variable is
significant in the model. This indicates that an individual’s preferences for control over nature
and attitudes toward control exerted on their farms by others are not important in the tillage
adoption decision.
In sum, the results presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8 indicate that the refined metaeconomic
model that includes habitual tendencies and preferences for control is vastly superior at
predicting tillage behavior in the Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake watershed than the standard
microeconomics model. This metaeconomic model gives the largest Nagelkerke R-square
statistics, best overall model fit, and yields the greatest percentage of correct 0,1 dependent
variable predictions. Thus, our results suggest that new economic models that account for the

psychological dispositions described should be created in order to truly understand the
conservation adoption decision made by farmers.
VI. Conclusions
This study was very unique in nature. This research could be classified as an economic
study, and includes all the elements one would expect to find in an empirical study using derived
demand theory as presented in microeconomic-based production economics. However, the
research conducted also sought to go beyond and transcend (the notion of “meta”) the traditional
economic framework, and thus metaeconomic theory (which includes elements from psychology,
sociology, and other social sciences) was also used to test the motivations for farmer
conservation behavior.
The results produced from the research are also very unique in nature. For instance, the
results indicate that a farmer’s income/financial capacity is an important factor in the
conservation tillage adoption decision faced by farmers in the Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake
watershed. This result makes intuitive sense, as most conservation practices are not inherently
profitable and there is some level of cost associated with purchasing new equipment that must be
used in order to farm using conservation tillage strategies. What makes the result truly
remarkable, though, is that increases in income/financial capacity, in an absolute sense, actually
have a very small (albeit significant) impact upon the conservation tillage decision. This result is
completely counter to the idea that substantial increases in income are needed in order to induce
farmers to engage in conservation tillage activities.
In addition to the findings concerning the role of income in farmer tillage behavior, other
psychological variables included in this research make the results distinctive and somewhat
ground breaking. Most prominent in this research is the fact that both self-interest tendencies

and shared other-interest tendencies play a role in the conservation tillage adoption decision
made by farmers in the Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake watershed. This result is similar in nature
to the results found in the studies conducted by Chouinard et al (2008) and Bishop et al (2009).
All three works have found empirical evidence that both self-interest (financial) motives and
shared other-interest motives impact the conservation adoption decision.
Logit models created with survey data collected in the region show the importance of the
self-interest and shared other-interest interaction. In all models, the shared other-interest*selfinterest variable proved to be significant when attempting to predict conservation adoption in the
watershed. Since the selfism scale was ultimately reversed when creating this interaction
variable, the result is really a measure of how a person is oriented towards the shared otherinterest in farming. The results ultimately show that those farmers who are less selfish in nature
are likely currently using conservation tillage practices and are much more likely to continue
using the technology in the future.
In addition to the results concerning the shared other-interest*self-interest interaction, the
survey data compiled and models created also indicated that a farmer’s preferences regarding
autonomous and heteronomous control are also very important factors in the conservation tillage
adoption decision. The logit model considers three different exploratory control variables:
control over farm processes, control exerted by others, and preferences for control over nature.
The results of the logit models consistently show that farm control is a significant variable. This
result shows that if a person believes that they can use conservation tillage techniques and still
keep complete autonomous control over their farm, they will be more likely to use conservation
techniques. However, if a farmer perceives a loss of control over their farm by using
conservation tillage, the odds of conservation tillage adoption significantly deteriorate.

Finally, this research also concluded that a farmer’s habitual tendencies play a major role
in the tillage adoption decision. So, it appears that those that have used conservation tillage
strategies in the past are much more likely to continue using it in the future. However, it must be
cautioned that the opposite situation may also apply. This is to say, if a farmer has not been
convinced of the benefits of using conservation tillage techniques and continues to use intensive
tillage technologies, he or she is more likely to rely on subconscious feelings and intuition and
continue to use intensive tillage practices. In terms of policy, then, it seems imperative to jointly
build unity with cause and enhance financial incentives in order to help convince intensive tillage
farmers of the benefits of conservation tillage technologies. Once these intensive tillage users
have converted to conservation tillage techniques, they will then be much more likely to continue
using the technology.
The results from this study indicate that a single over-arching conservation policy
administered on a volunteer basis is not likely to be successful in reducing agricultural non-point
surface water pollution. This conclusion can be drawn because our survey results show that
farmers are very heterogeneous in their psychological and economic motivations. This is starkly
different than the homogenous Homo economicus assumed in standard economic theory.
The results show that farmers vary in the degree to which they act on self-interest and
shared other-interest tendencies. Those that are more self-interested in nature are most likely
influenced by mainly profit considerations. Therefore, financial incentive programs may help
encourage these farmers to engage in conservation practices. However, by only targeting these
self-interested individuals through the use of financial instruments, a large subset of the farming
population that is largely influenced by a psychological orientation toward the shared otherinterest are most likely not going to participate in the incentive programs. These other-interested

individuals are most likely to participate in programs that emphasize the aspect of farming that
can help them identify with others. In other words, they enjoy a connection with others that
comes from being identified as a “conservation farmer,” and being in unity with other such
producers.
While there are some in the farming community that are motivated to engage in
conservation activities by the extremes of either self-interest or shared other-interest, our results
show that most individual farmers will be motivated by a complex mix of self-interest and otherinterest on the metaeconomic satisficing path 0Z. So, it appears that the best conservation
policies are those that can emphasize both self- and other-interest.
Importantly, this study is another in a series of tests of metaeconomic theory, with similar
results. Metaeconmic tests began in the late 1980’s, and continue to this day. Intriguingly, these
studies continue to find evidence of a substantive role for both the shared other-interest and
control in an individual’s decision making process. However, this testing needs to be expanded
in order to further validate the generalizability of the model.
While there are indeed certain drawbacks to the metaeconomic research conducted in the
Blue River/Tuttle Creek watershed, the fact remains that the results produced have provided
some intriguing insights into potential motivators for farmers to utilize conservation tillage
strategies in the region. It is our hope, then, that these results and future research can help to
improve conservation policy in the United States. Hopefully, too, the improved policies can lead
to the restoration of rivers, streams, and lakes to a more natural and clean state, and conflicts
regarding water quality can be resolved.
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Table 1: Mean Results for Final Selfism*Empathy/Sympathy Variables

selfemp
self2symp
slfuserinf
slffarminf
slffamilyinf

N
488
488
482
483
483

Mean
24.07
22.65
20.75
21.92
21.42

Std.
Deviation
8.080
8.463
10.403
7.923
10.519

Missing
2.01%
2.01%
3.21%
3.01%
3.01%

Table 2: Mean Results for Final Selfism*Control Variables

N
479
478
478

slffarm
slfothers
slfnat

Mean
15.64
19.34
23.60

Std.
Deviation
5.627
6.776
10.007

Missing
3.82%
4.02%
4.02%

Table 3: Mean Results for Final Income Variable

income2

N
475

Mean
158.91

Std.
Deviation
211.413

Missing
4.62%

Table 4: Mean Results for Final Soil Slope Variable

slope

N
498

Mean
3.11

Std.
Deviation
0.648

Missing
0.00%

Table 5: Mean Results for Final Habit Variable

notilchng

N
497

Mean
3.85

Std.
Deviation
2.132

Missing
0.20%

Table 6: Logistic Estimation of No-Till Adoption Decision (Empathy Other-Interest Proxy)
Role of
Adding
Adding
Adding Selfism
Variable
Capital
Tempered Self
Habitual Tendency
Reinforced Control
1.005
0.006a
-0.033

-0.730
0.005a
0.016
0.070a

-1.823c
0.004a
0.038
0.066a
0.383a

-1.078
0.004a
0.008
0.090a
0.371a
-0.089a
0.013
0.002

-2 Log Likelihood

442.134

422.482

384.954

374.016

χ2 (Block)
χ2 (Model)

31.474a
31.474a

19.651a
51.125a

37.529a
88.653a

10.938b
99.592a

Nagelkerke R2

.100

.159

.266

.295

Percentage Correct:
0
1
Overall

0
100
81.7

2.2
99.8
81.9

23.1
96.8
83.3

28.6
95.8
83.5

2

3

4

7

Constant
Income
Slope
Empathy*Selfism
Habit
Selfism*Farm Control
Selfism*Other Control
Selfism*Nature Control

Df
a

b

c

Note: p<.01, p<.02, p<.05

Table 7: Logistic Estimation of No-Till Adoption Decision (Sympathy Other-Interest Proxy)
Role of
Adding
Adding
Adding Selfism
Variable
Capital
Tempered Self
Habitual Tendency
Reinforced Control
Constant
Income
Slope
Sympathy*Selfism
Habit
Selfism*Farm Control
Selfism*Other Control
Selfism*Nature Control

1.005
0.006a
-0.033

0.122
0.006a
-0.012
0.037b

-1.157
0.004a
0.004
0.041b
0.401a

-0.787
0.004a
-0.022
0.043c
0.391a
-0.082a
0.035
0.017

-2 Log Likelihood

442.134

435.479

393.881

384.343

χ2 (Block)
χ2 (Model)

31.474a
31.474a

6.655b
38.129a

41.598a
79.727a

9.538c
89.624a

Nagelkerke R2

.100

.120

.241

.267

Percentage Correct:
0
1
Overall

0
100
81.7

0
100
81.7

16.5
96.1
81.5

22.0
96.8
83.1

2

3

4

7

Df
a

b

c

Note: p<.01, p<.02, p<.05

Table 8: Logistic Estimation of No-Till Adoption Decision (Empathy/Others Other-Interest Proxy)
Role of
Adding
Adding
Adding Selfism
Variable
Capital
Tempered Self
Habitual Tendency
Reinforced Control
1.005
0.006a
-0.033

-0.734
0.005a
0.006
0.013
0.090a
-0.021

-1.894c
0.004a
0.020
0.014
0.084a
-0.016
0.381a

-1.176
0.004a
-0.022
0.016
0.093a
-0.010
0.374a
-0.094a
0.022
0.009

-2 Log Likelihood

442.134

413.540

376.536

365.692

χ2 (Block)
χ2 (Model)

31.474a
31.474a

28.593a
60.067a

37.005a
97.072a

10.844b
107.916a

Nagelkerke R2

.100

.185

.289

.317

Percentage Correct:
0
1
Overall

0
100
81.7

6.6
99.3
82.3

22.0
96.3
82.7

27.5
96.3
83.7

2

5

6

9

Constant
Income
Slope
Water User Empathy*Selfism
Farm Entity Empathy*Selfism
Family Empathy*Selfism
Habit
Selfism*Farm Control
Selfism*Other Control
Selfism*Nature Control

Df
a

b

c

Note: p<.01, p<.02, p<.05

Figure 1. Joint Interests. Relationship between the farmer’s pursuit of a joint self-interest (IG) on
path 0G and an internalized yet shared other-interest (IM) on path 0M with the path 0Z showing
sacrifice in both domains of interest.
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Figure 2. Blue River/Tuttle Creek Lake Watershed and four county critical area

